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中国土地资源配置中的隐形市场研究

作者: 罗湖平
出版日期:2018-01-01
浏览次数:4次
简介: 本书在新制度经济学的分析框架下,沿着资源配置效率改进路径,系统考察中国土地资源配置市场化取向中的治理结构效率和制度环境效率状况,发现并尝试揭示中国土地隐形市场的形成机理及其生成规律;结合“接地气”式的社会实践考察,重新界定中国语境下的土地隐形市场概念,系统梳理其现实形态,并对特殊地域上尤为凸显的土地隐形市场形态及其形成机理进行实证分析;总结提出中国土地资源配置效率追求下“制度环境优化一治理结构优化一土地行政优化”的三阶优化路径、土地隐形市场双重效应下的疏堵结合路径以及土地行政分层分类实施下的刚柔相济路径,由此分层分类分阶段地推进中国土地隐形市场显形化。
关键词: 土地资源  资源配置  隐形市场  

外层空间安全战略研究:维护外层空间战略安全与合法权益

作者: 徐能武
出版日期:2018-01-01
浏览次数:2次
简介: 外层空间安全形势的变化和我国航天事业的蓬勃发展,使得外层空间安全战略研究成为日益现实而紧迫的重大问题。从复合建构主义视角来看,和平发展背景下维护我国外层空间战略安全与合法权益是一个复合建构的过程。当前,我国参与推动外层空间由进化冲突向进化合作转变,应强调通过外层空间威摄来控制体系暴力倾向,防止外层空间武器化和军备竞赛;发展外层空间信息服务,增进沟通、融合;力促外层空间攻防对比由进攻占优向防御占优转变;加强外层空间安全外交,推动国际安全机制建构,以促进国家利益和人类共同利益的协调统一,最终助推人类命运共间体的构建。
关键词: 中外关系  外层空间  国家安全  

大都市发展的顶层设计

作者: 叶南客
出版日期:2017-01-01
浏览次数:21次
简介: 大都市发展已经成为当今世界城市化发展的一大趋势。南京作为全国唯一的科技改革试验区、长三角唯一特大城市、东部地区重要的中心城市,正在向现代化国际性人文绿都快速迈进,成为中国新一轮城市化和城市现代化的标杆城市。本书以南京大都市发展为例,深入分析了南京发展所处的新阶段和未来发展面临的内外部环境,剖析南京面临的新挑战以及呈现的新特征,在此基础上阐述了一系列新的发展理念和发展目标,最后提出了南京大都市未来发展的新战略、新路径。本书对当代中国的都市发展战略和对国内相同地域的城市定位及其发展谋划具有重要的价值导向作用。
关键词: 城市规划  都市发展  南京  

中国共产党国家文化安全战略

作者: 孙宁
出版日期:2016-01-01
浏览次数:29次
简介: 本书从中国共产党作为执政党,对国家文化安全负有不可推卸的重大使命和领导责任破题,梳理了党的历代领导人在国家文化安全思想上的理论发展脉络,聚焦我国当下文化安全状况所面临的优势、劣势、机遇和威胁,有针对性地提出了建设先进文化视域下中国共产党的国家文化安全战略对策,强调文化安全重在建设,只有先进的文化才是安全的文化。对建设文化强国和确保国家文化安全具有理论价值和现实意义。
关键词: 中国共产党  文化  国家安全  国家战略  

山阴(绍兴县)州山吴氏家族研究

作者: 佘德余
出版日期:2015-01-01
浏览次数:11次
简介: 明清两浙文化的兴盛与文化世家的繁荣互为表里,相互依存。山阴(绍兴县)州山吴氏家族为浙东著名的文化世家,在浙东文化史上占有一席之地。本书系统地考察了吴氏家族的渊源、流徙及其发展各个阶段的不同状况,州山吴氏家族如明代万历朝的兵部尚书吴总、清代康熙朝的兵部尚书吴兴柞、还有《古文观止》编纂者吴楚材、现代女作家吴似鸿等一批人物的武功和文学活动,及其与当时有关名人的交游情况。同时又细致探寻了吴氏家族步入官场的几种不同途径,揭示了“从军荫袭”独特的世家风尚,吴氏家族崛起后对绍兴地方的回馈和影响。
关键词: 家族  研究  绍兴县  

公共危机管理与西部地方政府执政能力问题研究

作者: 常永华
出版日期:2013-11-01
浏览次数:7次
简介: 本书以公共危机管理中的地方政府执政能力的基本理论、结构分析、路径选择及对策研究、评价和预警为主线,分为五个逐层递进的层面展开研究。分别依次为:基本理论层面,结构分析层面,对策选择层面,评价模型及实证分析层面,预警机制研究层面。主要建树包括:(1)对公共危机管理视阈下地方政府执政能力的结构进行了系统分析。从政府执政能力内涵、特征入手,对地方政府执政能力的结构进行解析,地方政府执政能力是一个整体性、综合性、系统性的能力,从不同的维度,表现出不同的能力,它是由各种各样的分支能力和能力要素有机组合而成的“合力”系统。(2)提出了公共危机管理中西部地方政府执政能力提升的对策选择。本书首先分析了提高政府执政能力的前提和关键是党的执政能力建设;进而从理念层面、操作层面和技术层面对提升我国西部地方政府执政能力的路径及对策进行了系统全面的论述。(3)构建了地方政府执政能力综合评价系统模型及实证研究。在对地方政府执政能力结构分析的基础上,将系统工程理论与分析方法应用于执政能力评价体系中,结合模糊数学的主要理论,紧紧把握住重要的要素指标的计量和综合理性的评价技术,提出了一套比较科学、合理、全面的地方政府执政能力评价指标体系,进而构建了西部地方政府执政能力综合评价系统模型。(4)建立了公共危机管理视角下的西部地方政府执政能力监测预警系统。本书论述了监测预警体系的基本功能及建构思想,执政能力监测预警的运作流程,提出了地方政府执政能力监测预警模型的基本框架,构建了基于数据仓库的地方政府执政能力监测预警管理系统。为我国地方政府执政能力监测预警实践的开展以及学术界研究的深化,提供了有益的参考和借鉴。本书内容丰富、资料翔实,既有系统的理论分析,又有深入的实证研究;既全面讨论了国内外政府执政能力研究的重要进展,又综合反映了作者在该领域取得的初步研究成果。但由于本人具备的理论基础不足,再加上对于政府执政能力的研究尚处于初期阶段,可资借鉴的研究成果不多,致使本人对地方政府执政能力的研究可能还存在许多需要进一步斟酌的地方。希望各位同仁多提宝贵意见。作者2013年3月于陕西师范大学
关键词: 公共危机  问题研究  西部  地方政府  

腐败对公共支出的影响及其治理对策研究

作者: 徐静
出版日期:2012-01-01
浏览次数:19次
简介: The rise of Institution Economics inspires economists’attention to corruption.Once the friction due to the institutional disfigurement hinders the wheel of economic growth,does corruption,the reason and the result as well of the institutional disfigurement,act as grease or sand of the crunch-crunch wheel?From the 1950s,west researchers began to find the answer and formed two different opinions.One believes that corruption can improve economic efficiency,and another believes that corruption hampers economic growth.From the 1980s,the economic transition in China,Central and Eastern Europe caused the widespread breed and spread of corruption.Corruption has great effects on public expenditure structure,domestic private investment,foreign direct investment,foreign trade,foreign aids,domestic financial system and financial crisis,thus affects economic growth,income distribution and economic security.Corruption is not due to economic reform,but the reform and open stimulates the wide spread of corruption in China indeed.China's CPI remains below 3.5 from 1995,so it belongs to the list of the relative corrupt countries on the world.Moreover,due to the low grading of BPI,China always goes to the bottom of the sample countries,which shows the great propensity of China's entrepreneurs to bribe.From the data of CI,the level of corruption in 30 provinces and municipalities in China has been very high at the end of the 1980s and the very beginning of the 1990s.In the following years,it eased somewhat.However,the level of corruption began to rise slowly after 2000.Multiple researches show that the scale and structure of public expenditure have some effects on economic growth.The effect of the former is uncertain,but the effect of the latter is remarkable.Productive expenditure improves economic growth,while rent-seeking expenditure results in lower efficiency and waste of resources.In China,the scale of public expenditure in all provinces and municipalities expands greatly and accords with the Wagner's Law.However,the unbalance of expenditure structure is obvious and solidified.In detail,the ratios of the administration expenditure,policy-related subsidies expenses and urban maintenance expenditure to the total expenditure are very high and increase year by year.On the contrary,the ratios of the expenditure for science and technology promotion and the expenditure for education,culture and health are too small.At the same time,the scales and structures of public expenditures are different in different economic regions.From the viewpoint of expenditure scale,the more developed east region has greater scale of public expenditure,while the less developed medium and west regions have relatively higher public expenditure per capita.From the viewpoint of expenditure structure,the provinces and municipalities in west region expend more on infrastructure,science,education,culture and health than east and medium regions.But the administration expenditure is much higher in west region too.Corruption restrains economic growth by means of affecting the public expenditure.How does and how can corruption influence the public expenditure scale,structure and efficiency?Will the influence spread to economic growth?And if the negative effects of corruption do exit,how can the government control corruption?Can the government control corruption by reducing the government intervention,improving the extent of marketization,privatization,internationalization and educational level,and carrying out efficiency wage?All should be answered in the research.Based on CI-an objective evaluating indicator of corruption,the book analyzes the effects of corruption on the scale,structure and efficiency of public expenditure .The model concludes that more corrupt governments tend to expend less,at the same time,the efficiencies of all kinds of public expenditure will be lower.However,public expenditures on rent-seeking sectors increase.To test the results empirically,the book studies the data of corruption indexes and kinds of public expenditure in 30 provinces and municipalities from 1989 to 2004.Then,the book combines 12 indexes to show the effects of government intervention,marketization,efficiency wage,educational level and economic growth on anti-corruption,which provides the policy suggestions for controlling corruption.The book consists of eight chapters,which are organized as follows:ChapterⅠ is an introduction.It shows the backgrounds,research motives,research methods and main contents,as well as the innovations and short-comings.ChapterⅡ is a literature summary.Economic analyses on corruption usually focus on three topics.One is the definition of corruption.Though numbers of researchers,research institutes and surveys define corruption differently,most of them look corruption as”the abuse of public power for private interests”.From the generalized view,corruption can be defined as the behavior that the person with public power misuses public power for private interests,which hurts the public interests.From a narrow sense,corruption can be considered as the misuse of public power by the public officials.The second topic focuses on the causes of corruption.Economic and noneconomic factors induce the spread of corruption.The former includes trade restrictions,government subsidies,price controls,low official wages and differences in natural resources,and the latter includes some political,cultural,religious,ethnic and gender factors.The third topic is the economic effects of corruption.Besides of economic efficiency,corruption can affect economic growth,international trade,capital formation and foreign aids greatly.But divergences exist in available researches based on different samples and measures.Chapter Ⅲ constructs a corruption index system.To avoid the bias of existing corruption indexes based on subjective assessment,such as GCR index,ICRG index,CPI and so on,the book tries to build up a new,objective corruption index of China.The corruption index is based on five objective indexes and three reference indexes.The five objective indexes include the number of corruption cases,the number of huge corruption cases,the amount of money involved in corruption cases,the number of corrupt mid-governmental officials and the number of corrupt officials in administrative organs,party organs,judicial organs and economic management departments.All the indexes have direct relation with corruption.The reference indexes include GDP per capita,urban Engel Index and rural Engel Index.,which have indirect relation with corruption.Based on two kinds of technical measures,the Analytic Hierarchy Process(AHP)and Artificial Neural Networks(ANN),the book builds up two relatively objective corruption indexes.Compared with CPI,CI calculated by ANN is more suitable and adopted at last.Chapter Ⅳ is the empirical test on the effects of corruption on the scale of public expenditure and economic growth.The book firstly outlines the basic condition of the increasing of total public expenditure.Secondly,based on CI constructed in Chapter Ⅲ,the paper builds up a Model of Simple Regression to analyze the effects of corruption on the scale of public expenditure and economic growth.The results show that corruption constraints economic growth and the scale of public expenditure.ChapterⅤ is a dynamic model of corruption.Based on reviewing the classical models of Barro(1990)and Ehrlich & Lui(1999),the book aims to improve the effects of corruption on public expenditure structure empirically by means of a dynamic growth model including corruption.In the model,corruption is considered as tax levied on investment,so it’s endogenous.Households can choose between working either in the productive sectors or in the rent-seeking activities.The public capital and investment can divided into productive type and physical type.When the revenue from the two types of activities equals,the economy reaches equilibrium.At the equilibrium point,the level of corruption has negative effects on the ratio of productive public investment to physical public investment as well as GDP per capita.ChapterⅥ analyzes the co-relationship between corruption and different kinds of public expenditures to test the effects of corruption on the ratio of infrastructure expenditure,administration expenditure,urban maintenance expenditure,expenditure for technical updates and transformation in enterprises,expenditure for science and technology promotion,expenditure for education,culture and health,expenditure on social pension and welfare and expenditure for subsidize rural production to the total public expenditure,which can measure the distortion effects of corruption on public expenditure structure quantitatively.Chapter Ⅶis the empirical analysis on anti-corruption policies.Based on the existing studies on anti-corruption,the book divides the policy tools of anti-corruption into five kinds such as government behaviors,marketization,efficiency wages,educational levels and economic growth.The five factors can be shown by the ratio of local government public expenditure to national government public expenditure,the ratio of public expenditure to local GDP,the ratio of administration expenditure to public expenditure,the ratio of expenditure on science,education,culture and health to public expenditure,the ratio of investment by non-state-owned economy to the social investment on fixed assets,the ratio of employment in non-state-owned economy to the total employment,the ratio of FDI to GDP,the ratio of foreign trade to GDP,the relative wages of public officials,the number of college students per million person,the growing rate of GDP and urban per capita disposable income.Then the paper uses a fixed effect model to analyze the effects if the above 12 factors on controlling corruption.Chapter Ⅷ includes the main conclusions and policy recommendations.Based on the proceeding results,the paper suggests of controlling corruption by building good economic,political,legal,regnlation culture and international environmental circumstances.The main conclusions are as follows:Firstly,corruption has obvious negative effects on the scale of public expenditure and economic growth.The simply co-relationship analysis shows that when CI improves 1%,GDP per capita drops 0.628% and the scale of public expenditure increases 0.125%.The former result is in accordance with the results of proceeding studies,but the latter is totally on the contrary with related research,which may due to the special economic and financial system in China.Secondly,corruption distorts public expenditure structure,and then hampers economic growth.The dynamic growth model of corruption demonstrates that a corrupt government tends to expend on rent-seeking sector,where corruption is prevalent.The book uses a simple containing 3840 datus to analyze the effects of corruption on the ratios of different public expenditure to the total expenditure.The results show that corruption has obvious positive effects on infrastructure expenditure,administrative expenditure and urban maintenance expenditure,but has obvious negative effects on expenditure for science and technology promotion,expenditure for education,culture and health,and expenditure on social pension and welfare.When the level of corruption improves 1%,infrastructure expenditure,administrative expenditure and urban maintenance expenditure will increase respectively 0.132%,0.145% and 0.345%.On the contrary,expenditure for science and technology promotion,expenditure for education,culture and health,and expenditure on social pension and welfare will drop respectively 0.143%,0.14% and 0.082%.Finally,various measures have different effects on controlling corruption.Drawn from the proceeding theoretical researches and policy operation,there’re a variety of anti-corruption policies,which have different effects.The book empirically tests the practical effects of 12 policy tools on controlling corruption.The results show that decreasing government intervention,cutting down rent-seeking expenditure,improving the degree of marketization can achieve remarkable success in controlling corruption.However,improving the public officials’wages,the level of education and the degree of internationalization cannot do much in anti-corruption.Key Words:Corruption,Public Expenditure,Economic Growth,Control Corruption

中国公共政策冲突实证研究:以城市管理行政执法领域为例

作者: 王仰文
出版日期:2011-01-01
浏览次数:0次
简介: 《中国公共政策冲突实证研究:以城市管理行政执法领域为例》的研究从当前亟待解决的理论问题和现实需要出发,以城市管理行政执法领域的公共政策冲突为观察切片,通过对聊城、青岛和上海的城市管理行政执法依据冲突现实的考察,以理论阐述与实证分析相结合的研究方法,系统分析了我国公共政策冲突现象的表现形态与具体成因,并进而提出了完善我国公共政策冲突解决机制的具体建议。
关键词: 政策科学  公共政策  
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