The implementation of China’s environmental policies is a widely-discussed topic in researches on China’s environmental governance. Studying this contributes to the revelation of internal mechanism of Chinese Political organizations’ providing public products.

Taking the performance of China’s mandatory indexes in five-year plans as research object，this book analyzes depth interviews with 42 cadres on both central and local levels and ministry/department/division level，survey data of 717 government officials as well as macro-performance of China’s environmental governance qualitatively and quantitately. An interpretation of specific implementation of environmental policies under the background of China’s current system is also provided. What is more，grounded theory is also used in building incentive-implementation-outcome model in environmental governance and verifying corresponding hypothesis with quantitate methods.

This book reaches the conclusion that China’s mandatory environmental index policy takes influence in both formal and informal incentivizing ways. Performance appraisal and accountability system of mandatory indexes on environment are not the major reason for local official’s emphasis on environmental governance. Informal incentives，like the guidance from the central government and the transition of focus from superior hierarchy，are major factors for local official to change their behaviors. Unlike former studies，this book discovers that informal system in China’s Political organizations can also promotes policy implementation，which indicates that despite the appearance of formal system，it is the informal system that dominates China’s Political organizations.

Key words：Environmental governance；Mandatory index；Policy implementation；Bureaucratic incentives

The implementation of China’s environmental policies is a widely-discussed topic in researches on China’s environmental governance. Studying this contributes to the revelation of internal mechanism of Chinese Political organizations’ providing public products. Taking the performance of China’s mandatory indexes in five-year plans as research object，this book analyzes depth interviews with 42 cadres on both central and local levels and ministry/ department/division level，survey data of 717 government officials as well as macro-performance of China’s environmental governance qualitatively and quantitately. An interpretation of specific implementation of environmental policies under the background of China’s current system is also provided. What is more，grounded theory is also used in building incentive-implementation-outcome model in environmental governance and verifying corresponding hypothesis with quantitate methods. This book reaches the conclusion that China’s mandatory environmental index policy takes influence in both formal and informal incentivizing ways. Performance appraisal and accountability system of mandatory indexes on environment are not the major reason for local official’s emphasis on environmental governance. Informal incentives，like the guidance from the central government and the transition of focus from superior hierarchy，are major factors for local official to change their behaviors. Unlike former studies，this book discovers that informal system in China’s Political organizations can also promotes policy implementation，which indicates that despite the appearance of formal system，it is the informal system that dominates China’s Political organizations. Key words：Environmental governance； Mandatory index； Policy implementation； Bureaucratic incentives（AI翻译）

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