对于转型期中国地方政府行为的研究，现有文献日益重视正式制度对官员行为的激励和约束作用：以GDP为标尺的相对绩效考核制度是改革开放后中国经济成功的决定因素，同时该正式制度也是地方政府忽视公共物品供给的重要原因。即使在考虑了正式制度及社会经济因素之后，本书仍然观察到地方政府在公共物品供给水平上存在着显著的地区和时间差异。然而，对于此差异背后的决定因素，现有文献却考察不足。本书认为，非正式制度是造成该差异的原因。通过采用地区领导人籍贯作为非正式制度的代理并利用1990—2010年的中国地级市数据，本书系统检验了上述假设。本书发现，和来自外地的地方领导人相比，那些在其籍贯地任职的官员有更大的动力为本地区提供公共服务：本地籍贯的领导在基础教育、公共医疗和环境保护上的财政投入比重显著高于外地籍贯的领导。本书同时发现，公共服务支出份额的增加是以基础设施建设支出的减少为代价的：本地籍贯官员对该项支出的投入比重显著低于外地籍贯官员。同时，利用省级数据及相同的模型设定，本研究也发现非正式制度在省级行政单位依然发挥作用，但作用程度减弱。上述发现彰显出在一个正式制度主导的环境中，非正式制度依然发挥着显著的作用，并在一定程度上弥补了前者的不足。在实证发现的基础上，本书又通过案例分析和访谈进一步考察了非正式制度发挥作用的机制。通过分析两个地级市的本地籍贯领导大力发展民生项目的行为以及普通民众对本地官员和外地官员的看法，本书详细说明了非正式制度对官员行为产生影响的机制，从而为实证分析揭示出的因果机制提供了证据。本书认为，造成上述差异的原因在于：相比于外地官员，本地官员更多地被嵌入当地的人际网络中，出于对本人及本家族在家乡声望的重视，他们会对民生项目有更多的投入。本书对非正式制度及两种制度互动的考察凸显出转型国家内部官员行为丰富的制度动态。

For the study of local government behavior in China during the transition period, the existing literature pays more and more attention to the incentive and constraint role of the formal system on the behavior of officials: the relative performance appraisal system with GDP as the yardstick is the determinant of China's economic success after the reform and opening up, and the formal system is also an important reason why local governments neglect the supply of public goods. Even after accounting for formal institutions and socioeconomic factors, the book observes significant regional and temporal differences in the level of local government provision of public goods. However, the existing literature has underexamined the determinants behind this difference. This book argues that informal systems are responsible for this discrepancy. This book systematically tests these hypotheses by using the origins of regional leaders as agents of the informal system and using data from China's prefecture-level cities from 1990 to 2010. The book finds that officials serving in their home areas have a greater incentive to provide public services to their regions than local leaders from other places: local leaders spend significantly more on basic education, public health care, and environmental protection than leaders from outside their home countries. The book also finds that the increase in the share of public service spending has come at the expense of infrastructure: local officials contribute significantly less to this expenditure than foreign officials. At the same time, using provincial data and the same model settings, this study also finds that the informal system still plays a role in provincial administrative units, but to a lesser extent. These findings highlight that in an environment dominated by formal institutions, informal institutions still play a significant role and compensate for the former's shortcomings to some extent. Based on the empirical findings, this book further examines the mechanisms by which informal systems work through case studies and interviews. By analyzing the behavior of local leaders in two prefecture-level cities to vigorously develop livelihood projects and the perceptions of ordinary people about local and foreign officials, this book details the mechanisms by which the informal system influences the behavior of officials, thus providing evidence for the causal mechanisms revealed by the empirical analysis. The book argues that the reason for this difference is that local officials are more embedded in local networks than foreign officials, and they are more invested in livelihood projects out of respect for themselves and their family's prestige in their hometowns. This book's examination of informal institutions and the interaction between the two institutions highlights the institutional dynamics that enrich the behavior of officials within countries in transition.（AI翻译）

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