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中国土地收益分配问题研究

ISBN:978-7-5203-0267-8

出版日期:2017-04

页数:235

字数:219.0千字

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基金信息: 国家社会科学基金资助项目(11BJY124) 展开
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图书简介

长期以来,中国实行城乡分割的二元土地制度,农村集体建设用地禁止上市流转。自20世纪80年代国有土地使用权实行有偿有期限制度以来,政府通过征收农村集体土地、国有土地出让、土地税收等形式获取了高额的土地收益,形成了中国特有的“土地财政”现象。随着城镇化的加速推进,土地资产化速度、规模不断扩大。据统计,2001—2016年,全国土地出让收入总额达30多万亿元,成为地方财政的主要财源。土地使用与价格的“双轨”制度使“土地财政”固化并不断强化,导致了农村集体土地所有权人及农民的土地财产权受到损害,也阻碍了农村经济的发展。若这种状况得不到改变的话,将会进一步加剧城市与农村的不平等,延缓中国新型新镇化进程。

一 关于农村集体经营性建设用地入市改革及收益分配问题

始于20世纪80年代的市场化改革,推动了广东南海市(现为佛山市南海区)、中山市等经济发达地区进行了自发性的集体建设用地入市探索;20世纪90年代至2014年是中国探索农村集体建设用地流转最为活跃的时期,具有代表性的苏州、芜湖、佛山市顺德区、南海区等地,在制度建设、土地收益分配、保护农村集体经济组织和农民土地财产权、推进农村城镇化与工业化等方面取得了一定的成效,为2015年国家15个试点地区的改革提供了有益的经验。

(一)国家试点地区入市改革的基本成效

2015年6月以来,各试点地区突破现行法律的限制,试行集体经营性建设用地入市改革,主要采取了“就地入市、产业集中区(调整入市)入市、城中村入市”三种入市路径。据不完全统计,2015年8月至2016年6月,共出让集体经营性建设用地42万平方米。其主要成效表现在:(1)初步构建了城乡统一的建设用地市场。一是试点地区建立了统一的城乡建设用地交易平台,如浙江德清、成都市郫县将集体经营性建设用地纳入统一的公共资源交易中心进行交易;佛山南海区纳入集体产权交易中心进行交易;其他试点地区纳入土地交易中心进行交易。二是赋予与国有土地同等的产权权利。试点地区集体经营性建设用地可以出让、租赁、转让、作价入股等方式流转,更重要的是赋予了集体经营性建设用地抵押担保的权利。三是初步建立了集体经营性建设用地地价体系,初步实现了与国有土地“同权同价”。试点地区对集体经营性建设用地进行了分等定级,制定了基准地价,为集体经营性建设用地入市交易提供了价格依据。(2)初步构建了国家、地方政府、集体和农民个人共享的土地收益分配机制。一是试点地区基本试行了“按类别、分用途、有级差”的征收土地增值收益调节金。二是土地收益分配重点向集体经济组织及成员倾斜。三是明确了集体土地收益使用用途及分配方式。农村集体获得的收益主要用于农村基础设施和公共设施建设以及农民社会保障等支出;对集体组织成员采取现金分配和股权量化相结合或全部量化为股权分配给农民等分配方式。

(二)现行集体经营性建设用地流转收益分配的主要问题

主要问题有:(1)农村集体土地所有权主体不清,土地收益分配主体模糊。在试点地区,一部分通过组建具有法人资格的集体股份经济合作社(村经济合作社)、乡(镇)资产经营公司或者是农民集体经济联合社等作为具体的入市主体;一部分通过村民小组、村委会、乡镇政府来行使土地权利。这些做法混淆了土地所有权、行政管理权(或村民自治组织)和土地产权经营管理权的界限,事实上造成了土地所有权主体的缺位和“虚化”。(2)土地收益分配方式、分配机制不完善。一是土地流转内部收益分配政策缺乏有效的制度安排。从目前试点地区来看,分配方式主要有:以入市收益作为集体资产折股量化到本集体经济组织成员,不进行现金分配,如浙江德清县、佛山南海区;采取现金分配与股权量化到集体经济组织成员相结合的办法,如成都市郫县等;直接分配现金给集体经济组织成员,如重庆市大足区等。二是在土地增值收益分配过程中,政府均按土地成交总价的一定比例征收土地增值收益调节金,而不是按照土地出让或流转总价扣除成本后的净收益征收,缺乏合理性和科学性,也可能导致农村集体经济组织和农民土地财产利益受损。

二 国有土地收益分配问题

由于城乡分割的二元制土地结构和土地价格双轨制的制度安排,政府垄断土地一级市场,地方政府大肆卖地的行为既包含体制因素,也包含经济因素,形成了中国特有的“土地财政”与“地方主体税缺位”的现象。

(一)国有土地出让收益分配的问题

国有土地出让收益的主要问题有:(1)国有土地出让收入异化为地方政府的“第二财政”。据统计,2001—2015年,中国国有土地出让收入达27万多亿元,国有土地出让收入占地方财政一般预算收入的比重高,2010—2015年6年里平均占地方财政一般预算收入的比重为55.30%,最高年份达到66.76%(2010年)1764875。(2)地方债务对土地出让收入依存度高。地方政府为了改善城市基础设施和发展地方经济,大量举债筹资融资,国有土地出让收入成为地方政府偿还债务的主要资金来源。(3)国有土地抵押融资问题突出。据统计,84个重点城市土地抵押面积从2007年的13.01万公顷增加到2015年的49.08万公顷,增长了3.77倍;抵押贷款从2007年的13433亿元增长到2015年的113300亿元1764876,增长8.43倍。土地抵押面临着较大的偿债风险和地方财政风险。

(二)土地(房地产)税收存在的主要问题

土地(房地产)税制存在的主要问题有:(1)征税范围小,税基偏窄。主要针对城镇国有土地使用权、城镇房地产征收,对农村集体土地、农村房产不征土地(房地产)税;仅对经营性土地(房地产)征税,对非经营性土地(房地产)不征税;税率偏低且减税免税范围过宽。(2)税制结构不合理,重“流转”、轻“保有”。房地产保有税收所占比重低,仅占房地产税收总额21%左右。(3)房地产税占地方财政一般预算收入的比重低。目前房地产税收总额占地方财政一般预算收入的比重约为25%;房地产财产税所占比重更低,约为4.5%—5%。

三 中国土地收益分配政策选择

土地收益分配问题,涉及集体土地所有权、用益物权、经营权等多层次土地产权与土地收益配置问题,涉及国家、集体土地所有权人、土地用益物权人与土地经营权人多元化产权主体之间的经济利益分配与再分配问题,是土地制度改革创新的关键。

(一)集体经营性建设用地流转收益分配政策

(1)切实解决好农村集体经济组织成员权资格问题,保障农民土地财产权利。农村村民只有具备了农村集体成员资格,才能享有农村集体土地财产权的分配权。我们认为,农村集体成员资格应以农村集体产权改革(或集体建设用地入市改革)起始点为依据来确定。(2)土地收益分配重点向集体经济组织及成员倾斜。(3)构建兼顾公平与效率的集体经营性建设用地流转收益共享机制。国家通过征收土地增值税、流转所得税来调节分配;集体经济组织从初次流转收益中提取一定比例作为集体资产,设立集体土地收益基金,专门用于农村公共品投入以及农民社会保障支出,以促进农村经济的可持续发展;剩余部分采取股权与现金分配相结合的方式分配给农民,具体比例由各地根据实际情况确定。

(二)国有土地收益分配政策

(1)规范国有土地出让收支行为,实行基金预算管理。一是国有土地出让收入纳入政府性基金预算管理,使之成为地方公共财政的重要组成部分。二是改革目前从国有土地出让收入中按纯收益计提农业土地开发资金、保障性住房建设资金、农田水利建设资金、教育资金、被征地农民保障资金的做法,改为统一按国有土地出让总收入计提,防止地方政府随意降低计提专项资金,保障民生公共品的供给,满足民生的基本需求。(2)设立中央、省和县(市)三级国有土地收益基金。(3)实行国有土地出让收入中央与地方分享。根据中国法律,国有土地所有权人为中央政府,中央政府授权地方政府行使土地所有权,是一种委托代理权,中央政府分享国有土地出让收入是国有土地所有权在经济上实现的一种体现。当然,因土地不可移动且受益具有地方性的特点,国有土地出让收入绝大部分应归地方政府享有。具体分享比例根据地区经济发展水平及国家宏观管理需要来确定,中西部地区分享比例应高于东部发达地区,以支持中西部地区的经济发展,从而逐步实现区域经济的均衡发展。(4)赋予地方政府以土地资产为担保发行土地债券的权利。通过发行土地债券筹集的资金主要用于土地收购、土地开发整理、地方基础设施建设和公共配套设施建设等。土地债券以长期债券为主,其期限可定为5—10年,实行固定票面利率,每年付息,到期还本;或以持有的债券优先兑换一定年期的国有建设用地使用权。地方政府根据土地市场价格和物价指数情况,确定土地债券的发行价格。

(三)土地(房地产)税收改革政策建议

(1)扩大征税范围,实行城乡统一的土地(房地产)税制。将所有建设用地和房地产纳入征税范围,严格控制税收减免范围,逐步建立一个税负公平且增进效率的城乡统一的土地(房地产)税制。(2)简化税种,完善土地(房地产)税制。一是合并城镇土地使用税、耕地占用税、土地契税、房产税,改征房地产财产税;二是设置土地闲置税;三是完善土地增值税制,实行城乡统一的土地增值税。将现行征收的集体经营性建设用地土地增值收益调节金改为征收土地增值税;课征范围应当扩大至所有引起土地增值的行为,将所有土地增值收益纳入征税范围。将现有的土地(房地产)转移增值税调整为“土地(房地产)转移增值税”“土地(房地产)租赁增值税”“土地(房地产)保有增值税”三个税目。(3)优化土地(房地产)税制结构。把课征重点从土地(房地产)流转环节调整到土地(房地产)保有环节,将房地产财产税培育成为县(市)地方政府主体税种,逐步将房地产保有环节的税负提高到占房地产税收50%左右,为去“土地财政”提供制度基础。

For a long time, China has implemented a dual land system of urban-rural separation, and rural collective construction land has been prohibited from being listed and transferred. Since the implementation of the paid term system for the right to the use of state-owned land in the 80s of the 20th century, the government has obtained high land revenues through the expropriation of rural collective land, the transfer of state-owned land, land taxation, etc., forming a unique phenomenon of "land finance" in China. With the acceleration of urbanization, the speed and scale of land assetization continue to expand. According to statistics, from 2001 to 2016, the total income from land transfer in the country reached more than 30 trillion yuan, becoming the main source of local finance. The "dual-track" system of land use and price has solidified and continuously strengthened "land finance", which has led to damage to the land property rights of rural collective land owners and farmers, and hindered the development of rural economy. If this situation is not changed, it will further exacerbate urban and rural inequalities and slow down China's new urbanization process. I. The reform of rural collective operation construction land entering the market and the distribution of income began with the market-oriented reform in the 80s of the 20th century, which promoted the spontaneous exploration of collective construction land in economically developed areas such as Nanhai City (now Nanhai District of Foshan City) and Zhongshan City in Guangdong Province; From the 90s of the 20th century to 2014, China was the most active period in exploring the circulation of rural collective construction land, and representative places such as Suzhou, Wuhu, Shunde District of Foshan City, Nanhai District and other places achieved certain results in system construction, land income distribution, protection of rural collective economic organizations and farmers' land property rights, and promotion of rural urbanization and industrialization, providing useful experience for the reform of 15 pilot areas in 2015. (1) Basic results of the reform of entering the market in the national pilot areas Since June 2015, each pilot area has broken through the restrictions of the current law and tried to implement the reform of collective operation construction land entering the market, mainly adopting three entry paths: "local entry into the market, industrial concentration area (adjusted to enter the market), and urban villages entering the market". According to incomplete statistics, from August 2015 to June 2016, a total of 420,000 square meters of construction land for collective operation were transferred. Its main achievements are: (1) The initial construction of a unified urban and rural construction land market. First, pilot areas have established a unified urban and rural construction land trading platform, such as Deqing in Zhejiang and Pixian in Chengdu City, which include collectively operated construction land into a unified public resource trading center for trading; Foshan Nanhai District is included in the collective property rights trading center for trading; Other pilot areas are included in the Land Exchange Centre for trading. The second is to grant the same property rights as state-owned land. Construction land for collective operation in pilot areas can be transferred, leased, transferred, and purchased as shares at a price, and more importantly, the right of mortgage guarantee for construction land for collective operation is granted. Third, a land price system for construction land for collective operation has been initially established, and the "same right and same price" as state-owned land has been initially realized. The pilot areas have graded the construction land for collective operation, and formulated a benchmark land price, which provides a price basis for the market transaction of construction land for collective operation. (2) The land income distribution mechanism shared by the state, local governments, collectives and individual farmers was preliminarily constructed. First, the pilot areas have basically implemented on a trial basis the adjustment fee for land value-added income levied "according to category, use, and gradation". Second, the focus of land revenue distribution is tilted towards collective economic organizations and their members. Third, it clarifies the use and distribution methods of collective land revenues. The income obtained by rural collectives is mainly used for the construction of rural infrastructure and public facilities, as well as the social security of farmers. For members of collective organizations, a combination of cash distribution and equity quantification or all quantification of equity is adopted to distribute equity to farmers. (2) The main problems in the distribution of income from the circulation of construction land for collective operation at present are: (1) The ownership subject of rural collective land is not clear, and the main body of land income distribution is ambiguous. In the pilot areas, some of them are specific entities to enter the market by forming collective shareholding economic cooperatives (village economic cooperatives), township (town) asset management companies or farmers' collective economic associations with legal personality; Land rights are exercised partly through villagers' groups, village committees, and township governments. These practices confuse the boundaries between land ownership, administrative management rights (or villagers' autonomous organizations) and land property rights management rights, and in fact cause the absence and "virtual transformation" of land ownership subjects. (2) The land revenue distribution method and distribution mechanism are not perfect. First, the policy of internal income distribution of land circulation lacks effective institutional arrangements. From the perspective of the current pilot areas, the distribution methods mainly include: the income from entering the market is quantified to the members of the collective economic organization as a collective asset, and no cash distribution is carried out, such as Deqing County in Zhejiang and Nanhai District in Foshan; Adopt a combination of cash distribution and equity quantification to members of collective economic organizations, such as Pi County, Chengdu; Direct distribution of cash to members of collective economic organizations, such as Dazu District of Chongqing. Second, in the process of land value-added income distribution, the government levies a certain proportion of the total land transaction price, rather than the net income after deducting the cost of land transfer or circulation, which lacks rationality and scientificity, and may also lead to damage to the interests of rural collective economic organizations and peasants' land property. 2. The distribution of state-owned land revenue Due to the dual land structure divided between urban and rural areas and the institutional arrangement of the dual-track land price system, the government monopolizes the primary land market, and the local government's large-scale land sales contain both institutional and economic factors, forming a unique phenomenon of "land finance" and "lack of local main tax" in China. (1) The distribution of proceeds from the sale of state-owned land The main problems of the proceeds from the sale of state-owned land are: (1) The income from the sale of state-owned land is alienated into the "second finance" of local governments. According to statistics, from 2001 to 2015, China's state-owned land transfer income reached more than 27 trillion yuan, and the proportion of state-owned land transfer income in local financial general budget revenue was high, and the average proportion of local financial general budget revenue in the six years from 2010 to 2015 was 55.30%, and the highest year reached 66.76% (2010) 1764875. (2) Local debt is highly dependent on land transfer income. In order to improve urban infrastructure and develop the local economy, local governments have borrowed a lot of money to raise funds, and the income from the sale of state-owned land has become the main source of funds for local governments to repay debts. (3) The problem of state-owned land mortgage financing is prominent. According to statistics, the land mortgage area in 84 key cities increased from 130,100 hectares in 2007 to 490,800 hectares in 2015, an increase of 3.77 times; mortgage loans increased from 1,343.3 billion yuan in 2007 to 1,1330 billion 1764876 yuan in 2015, an increase of 8.43 times. Land mortgages face greater debt repayment risks and local fiscal risks. (2) The main problems in land (real estate) taxation are: (1) The scope of taxation is small and the tax base is narrow. It is mainly levied on the right to the use of state-owned land and urban real estate in cities and towns, and does not levy land (real estate) tax on rural collective land and rural real estate; Only operating land (real estate) is taxed, and non-operating land (real estate) is not taxed; The tax rate is low and the scope of tax reduction and exemption is too broad. (2) The structure of the tax system is unreasonable, emphasizing "circulation" and "retention". The proportion of real estate ownership tax is low, accounting for only about 21% of the total real estate tax revenue. (3) The proportion of real estate tax in the general budget revenue of local finance is low. At present, the total real estate tax revenue accounts for about 25% of the general budget revenue of local finance; The share of real estate property tax is even lower, about 4.5%-5%. 3. China's land revenue distribution policy selection Land revenue distribution issues involve multi-level land property rights and land revenue allocation issues such as collective land ownership, usufruct rights, and management rights, and involve the distribution and redistribution of economic benefits between the state, collective land owners, land usufruct rights holders and diversified property rights holders, which is the key to land system reform and innovation. (1) Policies for the distribution of income from the circulation of construction land for collective operation (1) Effectively solve the problem of membership qualifications of rural collective economic organizations and protect peasants' land and property rights. Only when rural villagers have the qualifications of rural collective membership can they enjoy the right to distribute rural collective land property rights. We believe that the membership of rural collectives should be determined on the basis of the starting point of the reform of rural collective property rights (or the reform of collective construction land entering the market). (2) The focus of land income distribution is tilted towards collective economic organizations and members. (3) Establish a revenue sharing mechanism for the circulation of collective operation construction land that takes into account fairness and efficiency. The state regulates distribution by levying land value-added tax and turnover income tax; Collective economic organizations take a certain proportion of the initial circulation income as collective assets, and set up a collective land revenue fund, which is specially used for rural public goods input and farmers' social security expenditure, so as to promote the sustainable development of rural economy; The remaining part is distributed to farmers by combining equity and cash distribution, and the specific proportion is determined by each locality according to the actual situation. (2) Policy on the distribution of state-owned land revenue (1) Standardize the revenue and expenditure of state-owned land transfer, and implement fund budget management. First, the income from the sale of state-owned land is included in the budget management of government funds, making it an important part of local public finance. The second is to reform the current practice of allocating funds for agricultural land development, affordable housing construction, farmland water conservancy construction, education, and security funds for peasants whose land has been expropriated from the net income from the income from the sale of state-owned land, and change it to a unified calculation based on the total income from the transfer of state-owned land, so as to prevent local governments from arbitrarily reducing the provision of special funds, ensure the supply of public goods for people's livelihood, and meet the basic needs of people's livelihood. (2) Establish state-owned land revenue funds at the central, provincial and county (city) levels. (3) Implement the sharing of income from the transfer of state-owned land between the central and local governments. According to Chinese law, the owner of state-owned land is the central government, and the central government authorizes local governments to exercise land ownership, which is a kind of entrusted agency right, and the central government's sharing of the income from the transfer of state-owned land is a manifestation of the economic realization of state-owned land ownership. Of course, because the land is immovable and the benefits are local, the vast majority of the income from the sale of state-owned land should go to local governments. The specific sharing ratio is determined according to the level of regional economic development and the needs of national macro-management, and the sharing ratio in the central and western regions should be higher than that in the developed eastern regions, so as to support the economic development of the central and western regions, so as to gradually achieve the balanced development of the regional economy. (4) Give local governments the right to issue land bonds secured by land assets. The funds raised through the issuance of land bonds are mainly used for land acquisition, land development and consolidation, local infrastructure construction and public supporting facilities construction. Land bonds are mainly long-term bonds, the maturity of which can be set at 5-10 years, with a fixed coupon rate, annual interest payments, and principal repayment at maturity; Or give priority to exchanging the bonds held for the right to use state-owned construction land for a certain period of time. Local governments determine the issuance price of land bonds based on land market prices and price indexes. (3) Land (real estate) tax reform policy suggestions (1) Expand the scope of taxation and implement a unified urban and rural land (real estate) tax system. All construction land and real estate will be included in the scope of taxation, the scope of tax exemptions and exemptions will be strictly controlled, and a unified urban and rural land (real estate) tax system with fair tax burden and improved efficiency will be gradually established. (2) Simplify taxes and improve the land (real estate) tax system. The first is to merge the urban land use tax, cultivated land occupation tax, land deed tax, and real estate tax, and replace it with real estate property tax; the second is to set up a land idle tax; The third is to improve the land value-added tax system and implement a unified urban and rural land value-added tax. Change the adjustment fee for land appreciation income of collective operation construction land currently levied to land value-added tax; The scope of taxation shall be extended to all acts that cause land appreciation, and all land appreciation gains shall be included in the scope of taxation. The existing VAT on land (real estate) transfer will be adjusted to three tax items: "VAT on land (real estate) transfer", "VAT on land (real estate) lease" and "VAT on land (real estate) ownership". (3) Optimize the structure of the land (real estate) tax system. Adjust the focus of taxation from the land (real estate) circulation link to the land (real estate) ownership link, cultivate the real estate property tax into the main tax of the county (city) local government, and gradually increase the tax burden of the real estate ownership link to about 50% of the real estate tax revenue, so as to provide an institutional basis for the elimination of "land finance".(AI翻译)

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GB/T 7714-2015 格式引文
邓宏乾.中国土地收益分配问题研究[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,2017
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MLA 格式引文
邓宏乾.中国土地收益分配问题研究.北京,中国社会科学出版社:2017E-book.
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邓宏乾(2017).中国土地收益分配问题研究.北京:中国社会科学出版社
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